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INDUS BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
 
Dr. Waseem Ahmad Qureshi* 
ABSTRACT 
 
The management of international watercourses is a 
prominent global issue, owing to the rapid growth of water 
scarcity worldwide. This issue is particularly dominant in the 
Indus Basin, which India and Pakistan share. Both states use the 
water of the Indus Basin for irrigation, hydropower generation, 
and multiple other purposes. However, certain Indian water 
management projects are threatening the current water 
management infrastructure in Pakistan by substantially 
obstructing the flow of water in the Pakistani western rivers. In 
this regard, the Indus Waters Treaty provides recommendations to 
both states for adequately managing the Indus waters. Moreover, 
there are several principles and conventions in international law 
that include provisions for transboundary watercourses 
management. These principles also advise states, including India 
and Pakistan, on how to manage the watercourses sustainably, 
how not to cause harm to other states, and how to adopt special 
water management measures to prevent depletion, pollution, and 
environmental degradation of watercourse basins. 
 
*Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan 
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Water scarcity is the most pressing issue of these 
times.1 Pakistan has become a water-stressed country2 and is 
rapidly becoming a water-scarce country.3 Therefore, it is 
essential to give attention to adequately managing the water 
resources available in Pakistan. The economy of Pakistan is 
reliant on agriculture,4 and Pakistan is dependent on the 
flow of water in the Indus River and its tributaries for 
irrigating crops.5 India also shares the Indus Basin.6 The 
Indus Waters Treaty is the sole legal agreement that is 
                                                
	
	
1 Lyla Mehta, Contexts and Constructions of Water Scarcity, in, STATE OF 
JUSTICE IN INDIA: ISSUES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE, 58 (Ranabir Samaddar ed., 
2009) [hereinafter Mehta]. 
2 Tariq Fatemi, Looking Ahead, in, THE FUTURE OF PAKISTAN 107, 114 
(Stephen P. Cohen, 2011). 
3 Muhammad Junaid Usman Akhtar et al., Public Participation and Co-
Production in the Irrigation Sector of Punjab, Pakistan, in, PUBLIC SECTOR 
REFORMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: PARADOXES AND PRACTICES 39, 44 
(Charles Conteh & Ahmed Safiqul Huque eds., 2014). 
4 See Shuja Nawaz, The Clash of Interests and Objectives, in THE FUTURE OF 
PAKISTAN 150, 151 (Stephen P. Cohen, 2011). 
5 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, CLIMATE 
AND SOCIAL STRESS: IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY ANALYSIS, 122 (John D. 
Steinbruner et al. eds., 2013). 
6 SHARAD K. JAIN ET AL., HYDROLOGY AND WATER RESOURCES OF INDIA, 
507 (2007). 
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binding on both states in the utilization of the waters of the 
Indus Basin.7  
The treaty includes recommendations on water 
management for both states.8In addition to the Indus Waters 
Treaty, there are several obligations under international law, 
which include instructions for the management of 
transboundary water resources for states. The Berlin Rules, 
the United Nations Watercourses Convention, the Belgrade 
Rules, the Supplemental Rules on Pollution, and the 
Johannesburg Declaration offer instructions regarding the 
management of a common river basin. This paper will 
discuss these recommendations only for surface 
watercourses in general and for the management of Indus 
Basin; the management of groundwater and other water 
resources is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The second section of this paper elaborates on water 
management in the Indus Basin region in Pakistan. The total 
demand for the water of the Indus Basin and the average 
annual flow of the water in its tributaries are discussed, as 
are the factors that affect this flow of water. Indian water 
storage projects and adverse changes in the climate are the 
major factors responsible for harming the natural flow and 
management of the water of the Indus Basin in Pakistan, 
which will be discussed at the end of the first section. The 
third section of this paper explains the provisions of the 
Indus Waters Treaty, which recommends the construction of 
water management facilities in Pakistan.  
                                                
	
	
7 See BRAHMA CHELLANEY, WATER: ASIA'S NEW BATTLEGROUND, 278 
(2013). 
8 See Case Studies of Transboundary Water Management Initiatives: Fifteen 
Initiatives from Various Parts of the World, in TRANSBOUNDARY WATER 
MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE, 196 (Anton Earle et al. eds., 
2013). 
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The fourth section explains international legal 
conventions and rules, which provide instructions to 
riparian states for the management of international 
watercourses. Different factors such as the environmental 
impacts of water management practices by a state, the duty 
not to cause harm to other states by continuing water 
management projects, sustainable management and 
development of the watercourses, and the basin-wide joint 
management of the watercourses are discussed in this 
section in relation to certain water management practices in 
the Indus Basin by India and Pakistan. Conclusions are 
drawn briefly at the end of this paper. 
 
II. INDUS BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT IN PAKISTAN 
 
This section of the paper elaborates on the water 
management practices in the Indus Basin in Pakistan. It 
explains the demand for Indus Basin water in Pakistan and 
the relevant annual supply or flow of that water. The Indus 
Basin holds key importance for water management practices 
in Pakistan, as it is the only major source that brings a 
significant amount of water to the country;9 this water is 
used for irrigation, hydropower generation, industrial 
projects, and domestic and municipal purposes.10 For several 
                                                
	
	
9 Zeeshan Ali et. al., Taming Food Security Through Wastewater Irrigation 
Practices, in, PLANTS, POLLUTANTS AND REMEDIATION, 116 (Ozturk et al. 
eds., 2016). 
10 See, Water, in, 11TH FIVE YEAR PLAN, MINISTRY OF PLANNING, 
DEVELOPMENT & REFORM, GOVT. OF PAKISTAN, Chapter 20, 226 (2015) 
http://pc.gov.pk/uploads//plans//Ch20-Water1.pdf 
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centuries it has been the major resource for irrigation in the 
Punjab region of Pakistan.11 
The Indus Basin comprises the Indus River and its 
five tributaries, the Chenab, Jhelum, Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas 
Rivers.12 Among them, the Chenab, Jhelum, and Indus 
Rivers were allocated for the use of Pakistan by the Indus 
Waters Treaty.13 These tributaries, along with the Indus 
River, irrigate major portions of agricultural land in 
Pakistan.14 Furthermore, several canals and barrages have 
also been constructed that use water from the Indus River 
and its tributaries to irrigate crops.15 However, the 
increasing stress on water resources has raised questions 
                                                
	
	
11 Abdul Hafeezz Qaiser, Current Policy Perspective on Institutional Reforms 
for the Irrigated Agriculture Sector, in, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON MANAGING IRRIGATION FOR ENVIRONMENTALLY 
SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE IN PAKISTAN 46 (M. Badruddin et al. eds., 
1996); see also DAVID GILMARTIN, BLOOD AND WATER: THE INDUS RIVER 
BASIN IN MODERN HISTORY 7 (2015) [hereinafter Gilmartin]. 
12 See Gilmartin, supra note 11, at 14; see also APARNA PANDE, EXPLAINING 
PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY: ESCAPING INDIA, 43 (2011) [hereinafter 
ESCAPING INDIA]; see Aparna Pande, Pakistan: Issues of Self-Identity and 
Parity with India, in PAKISTAN’S POLITICAL LABYRINTHS: MILITARY, SOCIETY 
AND TERROR 1, 8 (Ravi Kalia, 2016). 
13 See ESCAPING INDIA, supra note 12, at 43. 
14 SARFRAZ MUNIR, ROLE OF SEDIMENT TRANSPORT IN OPERATION AND 
MAINTENANCE OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND BASED IRRIGATION CANALS: 
APPLICATION TO MACHAI MAIRA BRANCH CANALS, 8 (2011); see also ASMI 
RAZA, PAKISTAN’S QUEST FOR FOOD SECURITY, 40 (1993). 
15 John D. Rogers, The Economy: Labor Agriculture, in, PAKISTAN: A 
COUNTRY STUDY, Chapter 3, 173, (Peter R. Blood, ed., 1995); See also 
Nasim Akhtar, The Use of Irrigation System for Sustainable Fish Production 
in Pakistan, in, FISHERIES IN IRRIGATION SYSTEMS OF ARID SEA ASIA, 
Chapter 2, 19, (Tomi Petr ed., 2003); SAIYID ALI NAQVI, INDUS WATERS 
AND SOCIAL CHANGE: THE EVOLUTION AND TRANSITION OF AGRARIAN 
SOCIETY IN PAKISTAN, 7-8 (2012). 
2017 INDUS BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT 69 
regarding the efficiency of existing water management 
infrastructure in Pakistan.16 
 
A. THE DEMAND AND CONSUMPTION FOR THE INDUS 
BASIN WATER 
 
Although the demand for water is growing in all 
sectors, the annual growth in demand for water is highest in 
the agriculture sector.17 According to the statistics provided 
by the UNDP in its 2016 report, the net crop water 
requirement in Pakistan is at 101.7 MAF percent out of the 
total water consumption in the country.18 From the 143 MAF 
Average Annual Flow of water, nearly 101.8 MAF is 
diverted to the agricultural lands through the canal 
networks; however, only 56 MAF reaches to crops due to the 
conveyance losses of 45.5 MAF.19 Therefore, around 50 MAF 
of groundwater is extracted to meet the shortfall, which 
makes the availability of water at the farmlands at 106.5 
                                                
	
	
16 See generally Adrien Couton, Tackling the Water Crisis in Pakistan: What 
Entrepreneurial Approaches Can Add, in, WATER AND AGRICULTURE: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH 85, 86 (Ctr. for Strategic & 
Int’l Stud., 2009). 
17 The demand for water in the Indus Basin has also started to increase 
because of the yearly increase in total population. See WINSTON YU ET AL., 
THE INDUS BASIN OF PAKISTAN: THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE RISKS ON WATER 
AND AGRICULTURE 35, 54 (2013); see ASHOK SWAIN, UNDERSTANDING 
EMERGING SECURITY CHALLENGES: THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES 40-1 
(2013) (discussing the impact of population increase and the demand for 
water). 
18 Shahid Ahmad, Water Sector of Pakistan: A Situational Analysis, in, 
DEVELOPMENT ADVOCATE PAKISTAN – WATER SECURITY IN PAKISTAN: 
ISSUES AND CHALLENGES, 5 (Maheen Hassan ed., December 2016) 
[hereinafter Ahmad].    
19 Id., at 3-5. 
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MAF, which further falls to 79.9 MAF due to Field 
Application Losses.20 Thus, a shortfall of 21.8 MAF still 
exists, which mostly is met by the rainfalls.21  
The agricultural sector consumes the highest quantity 
of Indus water in Pakistan.22 According to an estimate, the 95 
percent of irrigation in Pakistan is to be found in the Indus 
River basin.23 The total area of agricultural land is 
approximately 21 million hectares,24 and more than 45 
percent of the population earns its livelihood in 
agriculture.25 Moreover, agriculture accounts for 25 percent 
of the total GDP of the country.26 Therefore, it is also 
regarded as the “backbone” of Pakistan’s economy.27 
On the other hand, the aforementioned net demand of 
101.7 MAF by the crops is expected to rise to 116.14 MAF by 
2025 forecasting a shortfall of 36.9 MAF, which highlights 
the need to perform stringent measures to avoid further 





22 See WORLD BANK INST., STRATEGIC REFORMS FOR AGRICULTURAL 
GROWTH IN PAKISTAN, 87 (Masood Ahmad & Rashid Faruqee eds., 1999); 
see 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD 874 (THOMAS M. 
LEONARD ED., 2013). 
23 IRRIGATION IN SOUTHERN AND EASTERN ASIA IN FIGURES – AQUASTAT 
SURVEY 37, 135, (FAO Water Report, 2011). 
24 Muhammad Zafar Khan & Ghulam Akbar, In the Indus Delta it is No 
More the Mighty Indus, in, RIVER CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT 69, 69 
(Philip J. Boon & Paul J. Raven eds., 2012). 
25 Mohammad Ashraf Choudhary et al., Prospects of No-Till Wheat in 
Rotation with Rice or Cotton in Central and South Asia, in, CONSERVATION 
TILLAGE: A VIABLE OPTION FOR SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE IN EURASIA, 
125, 127 (M. Karabayev et al. eds., 2000).  
26 Id. 
27 Muhammad Shahbaz et al., Effect of Financial Development on 
Agricultural Growth in Pakistan: New Extensions from Bounds Test to Level 
Relationships and Granger Causality Tests, 40 INT’L J. SOC. ECON. 708 (2011),  
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shortfall of water for agricultural sector in Pakistan.28 
Moreover, the quality of groundwater is unsatisfactory for 
irrigating crops due to the presence of certain elements that 
are considered harmful for soil fertility.29 Therefore, to 
depend less on groundwater, more attention should be 
given to extracting as much river water as possible for 
irrigating crops, meaning a greater intensification of demand 
for Indus water in Pakistan. 
 
B. EXISTING WATER MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE 
INDUS BASIN IN PAKISTAN 
 
 As mentioned earlier, Pakistan is largely dependent 
on the Indus Basin for water for agriculture and other 
sectors, and to meet these needs, several canals—forty-three 
to be exact—draw water from the Indus River and its 
tributaries.30 These canals irrigate most agricultural land in 
the country.31 In addition to the canals, barrages have also 
                                                
	
	
28 The 36.9 MAF is equal to the current 21.81 MAF shortfall plus 15.1 
MAF increase in net crop water requirement. See Hassan, supra note 18, 
at 5.  
29 Sanval Nasim & Steven Helfand, OPTIMAL GROUNDWATER 
MANAGEMENT IN PAKISTAN’S INDUS WATER BASIN, 1 (Int’l Food Pol’y Res. 
Inst., Working Paper No. 034, 2015); see also TUSHAAR SHAH, ET AL., 
IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT IN PAKISTAN AND INDIA: COMPARING NOTES ON 
INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES 8 (Int’l Water Mgmt. Inst., Working Paper No. 
4, 2000) [hereinafter Shah et. al.]. 
30 See ASAD SARWAR QURESHI, HUGH TURRAL, AND ILYAS MASIH, 
STRATEGIES FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF CONJUNCTIVE USE OF SURFACE 
WATER AND GROUNDWATER RESOURCES IN SEMI-ARID AREAS: A CASE 
STUDY FROM PAKISTAN, 1 (2004) [hereinafter Qureshi et. al.]. 
31 See Sohail J. Malik, et al., Agriculture, Land, and Productivity in Pakistan, 
in AGRICULTURE AND THE RURAL ECONOMY IN PAKISTAN: ISSUES, 
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been constructed in certain regions to use the water of the 
Indus Basin.32 On the Indus River alone there are fifteen 
barrages used for irrigation.33 The canals and barrages make 
Pakistan’s irrigation system one of the largest in the world.34 
 Approximately, 0.58 million tube-wells have been 
installed in the agrarian regions for irrigating crops from 
using the ground water.35 On the other hand, in certain 
regions that have a scarcity of water and have no tube-wells 
installed due to meager electricity available for running 
them, the Karez system is used for extracting groundwater.36 
The system has been commonly used for several decades in 
these regions, prominently in Baluchistan, to meet irrigation-
related needs.37 Though the system uses groundwater 
resources for irrigation, but the method is sustainable as 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
OUTLOOKS, AND POLICY PRIORITIES 41, 47 tbl.2.4 (David J. Spielman et al. 
eds., 2016). 
32 See NIRMAL TEJ SINGH, IRRIGATION AND SOIL SALINITY IN THE INDIAN 
SUBCONTINENT: PAST AND PRESENT, 112 (2005). 
33 David Michel, Managing the Indus in a Warming World: The Potential for 
Transboundary Cooperation in Coping with Climate Change, in, IMAGINING 
INDUSTAN: OVERCOMING WATER INSECURITY IN THE INDUS BASIN 91, 99 
(Zafar Adeel & Robert G. Wirsing eds., 2016). 
34 MEHMOOD UL HASSAN & PRACHANDA PRADHAN, COORDINATED 
SERVICES FOR IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE IN PAKISTAN 84 (Int’l Irrigation 
Mgmt. Inst., Research Report No. 71, 1998); see also Nasim Akhtar, The 
Use of Irrigation Systems for Sustainable Fish Production in Pakistan, in, 
FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, FISHERIES IN 
IRRIGATION SYSTEMS OF ARID ASIA 17, 19 (Tomi Petr ed., 2003). 
35 See Shah et al., supra note 29, at 7-8. 
36 SHAHID AHMAD ET AL., DROUGHT MITIGATION IN PAKISTAN: CURRENT 
STATUS AND OPTIONS FOR FUTURE STRATEGIES 35 (Int’l Water Mgmt. Inst., 
Working Paper No. 85, 2004) [hereinafter Ahmad et at.]. 
37 Id.; see also ASAD SARWAR QURESHI & MUJEEB AKHTAR, ANALYSIS OF 
DROUGHT COPING STRATEGIES IN BALUCHISTAN AND SINDH PROVINCES OF 
PAKISTAN, 23 (Int’l Water Mgmt. Inst., Working Paper No. 86, 2004). 
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compared to the modern techniques of extracting ground 
water for irrigation, because it can be adopted by poor 
farmers as well.38 Therefore, most regions in Baluchistan are 
reliant on this system to irrigate their agricultural land.39 
Pertinently, the Karez system is also considered one of the 
oldest irrigation systems in the world,40 and this system has 
been considered inductive to sustainable development.41 
This shows that water management practices in Pakistan 
have historically been sustainable and efficient. 
 Furthermore, there are also three large dams, and 
several small ones, operational in Pakistan.42 The major 
dams are Tarbela, Mangla, and the Chashma, which 
originally had storage capacities of 9 MAF, 6 MAF, and 0.8 
MAF, respectively,43 implying a total storage capacity of 
around 15.8 MAF.44 However, this storage capacity is falling 
each year due to sedimentation and therefore, the three 
major dams now collectively store around 13.1 MAF of the 
annual flow of Pakistan’s rivers.45 The stored water is mostly 
used for hydropower generation.46 More than one third of 
                                                
	
	
38 Ahmad et al., supra note 36, at 35. 
39 Id. 
40 Id., at 13. 
41 See id. 
42 Michel, supra note 33, at 91, 99. 
43 See Shahid Amjad Chaudhry, Pakistan’s Indus Basin Water Strategy: Past, 
Present and Future, in, PAKISTAN: MOVING THE ECONOMY FORWARD, 200 
(Rashid Amjad and Shahid Javed Burki eds., 2015). 
44 See Water Sustainability in Pakistan, BUSINESS RECORDER, (October 15, 
2017), https://fp.brecorder.com/2017/10/20171015226410/. 
45 Id. 
46 See Zafar Adeel & Robert G. Wirsing, Introduction, in, IMAGINING 
INDUSTAN: OVERCOMING WATER INSECURITY IN THE INDUS BASIN 3, 11 
(Zafar Adeel & Robert G. Wirsing eds., 2016). [hereinafter Wirsing & 
Adeel]. 
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the country’s electricity demand is met by the hydropower 
generated by these dams.47 
 The government of Pakistan has also started 
implementing its plans to construct new water storage 
projects on the Indus River and its tributaries.48 Work has 
already begun on the Neelum and Jhelum Rivers via the 
Neelum–Jhelum water project, and on the Indus River via 
the Diamir Bhasha Dam.49 Once completed, these dams will 
provide sufficient amount of electricity into the national 
power grid. For example, the Neelum–Jhelum and Diamir 
Bhasha Dam power projects will have the capacity to 
produce 969 megawatts (“MW”) and 4,500 MW of electricity, 
respectively.50 Together, these dams will be able to generate 
5,469 MW of electricity, enough to meet the current shortfall 
of electricity, which is around 5,000 MW.51  
                                                
	
	
47 See id. 
48 ROCKIN TH. SINGH, INDIA’S WATER RELATIONS WITH HER NEIGHBOURS, 
233 (Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, 2011). 
49 See IMF, Pakistan: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper II 126 tbl.7.6 (2010) 
(Country Report No.10/183); see also Hashim et al., Project-distribution 
Planning in Supply Chain Management under Fuzzy Environment for Large-
scale Hydropower Construction Projects, in, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MANAGEMENT SCIENCE AND 
ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT: FOCUSED ON ELECTRICAL AND INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY, 569 (Jiuping Xu, Masoom Yasinzai, & Benjamin Lev, 2012); 
see BOGUMIL TERMINSKI, DEVELOPMENT-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT AND 
RESETTLEMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND SOCIO-LEGAL CONTEXT 98 
(2014). 
50 1 INT’L BUS. PUBL’NS USA, PAKISTAN ENERGY POLICY, LAWS AND 
REGULATIONS HANDBOOK: STRATEGIC INFORMATION AND BASIC LAWS 78 
(2015). 
51 Id. at 76; Khalid Hasnain, Electricity Shortfall Soars to 5,000MW, DAWN 
(April 16, 2017), www.dawn.com/news/1327253/electricity-shortfall-
soars-to-5000mw. 
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 In addition to rivers and dams, there are several man-
made and natural lakes in Pakistan. The water in these lakes 
is used for domestic purposes, such as drinking and 
irrigation by the locals residing near such lakes, particularly 
in the region of Baluchistan, which Indus water does not 
reach.52 These lakes store small amounts of water, which are 
intensified when there is high rainfall in these regions.53 Of 
these lakes, the Manchar Lake, located in Sindh province, is 
the largest lake in Pakistan.54 The area of Manchar Lake 
fluctuates with rainfall; in rainy seasons, the water of the 
lake covers a land area of around 520 square kilometers, 
while in drier seasons the water covers only 350 square 
kilometers.55 Nonetheless, the lake is sufficient to meet the 
water-related needs of the local population for drinking, 
domestic, and agrarian purposes.56 
 
C. DOMESTIC LAWS & POLICIES FOR WATER 
MANAGEMENT & PREVENTION OF FLOODS 
 
There are several federal and provincial laws in 
Pakistan related to the management of water resources, 
prevention of floods, and mitigation of adverse effects in the 
event of abnormal increases or decreases in river 
                                                
	
	
52 MUKHTAR AHMED, ANCIENT PAKISTAN – AN ARCHAEOLOGICAL HISTORY: 
HARAPPAN CIVILIZATION – THE MATERIAL CULTURE, 250 (2014) 
[hereinafter M Ahmed]. 
53 Id. 
54 MARC TYLER NOBLEMAN, PAKISTAN, 13 (2003). 
55 See generally Manchar Lake, SINDH TIMES (December 29, 2016), 
http://www.thesindhtimes.com/travel/manchar-lake-2. 
56 See M. AHMED, supra note 52, at 250. 
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watercourses.57 These laws also regulate and supervise 
national flood management policy. Some of these laws 
predate the state of Pakistan, as the laws were enacted 
during British colonial rule.58 These include the NWFP Act 
of 1873¸ the NWFP Canal and Drainage Act of 1873, the 
Sindh Irrigation Act of 1879, the Punjab Canal and Drainage 
Act of 1873, and the Punjab Irrigation Act of 1873.59 
Since partition, additional laws have been enacted in 
Pakistan, such as the Punjab Soil Reclamation Act 1952, the 
Water And Power Development Authority (“WAPDA”) Act 
1958, the Baluchistan Ordinance 1980, the Water Users 
Association Ordinances 1981, the Indus River System 
Authority (“IRSA”) Act 1992, the Provincial Irrigation and 
Drainage Authority (“PIDA”) Act 1997, and the 
Environment Protection Act 1997.60 These statutes are 
intended to manage surplus water as well as to avoid losses 
during floods.61 Moreover, these laws also provide relief and 
assistance to people in flood-affected regions.62 
In addition to these laws, the Emergency Relief Cells 
(ERC) and the Provincial Relief Department have been 
established for dealing with the flood-related emergencies.63 
The former has the role of coordinating between the Federal 
divisions and Provincial governments as well as among the 
semi-governmental and international and national agencies 
                                                
	
	
57 SIMI KAMAL, ET AL., DEVELOPMENT OF INTEGRATED RIVER BASIN 
MANAGEMENT (IRBM) FOR INDUS BASIN,: CHALLENGES AND 
OPPORTUNITIES 43 (2012) [hereinafter Kamal, et al.]. 
58 See id. 
59 Id., at 6, 13. 
60 Id., at 43. 
61 See id.  
62 Id. 
63 Id., at 45. 
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for emergency relief related operations.64 On the other hand, 
the latter is controlled by the Relief Commissioner who 
establishes coordination among relevant provincial entities 
for meeting the emergency relief requirements.65 
Furthermore, a separate government organization, the 
National Disaster Management Authority (“NDMA”), works 
to mitigate and prevent the adverse impacts of natural 
disasters, such as floods and droughts, in affected areas.66 
The NDMA provides relief and support to people recovering 
from flood or droughts.67  
Although, there are laws and several organizations 
functioning to manage the distribution of water in Pakistan, 
but an exact framework or regulation for managing water 
distribution in an efficient manner is lacking in the country.68 
In particular, there is no particular flood management policy 
in Pakistan; rather, the aforementioned laws indirectly 
provide some provisions for flood management.69 
Pertinently, the existing flood management has relied upon 
the adoption of structural measures for preventing floods.70 
For instance, the construction of flood walls, embankments, 
spurs, diversion structures and bypass structures, etc. have 
been adopted as some methods of preventing floods.71 In 




65 See id., at 46-7 (The success of the aforementioned organizations and 
entities is arguable as some consider them as a failure due to the massive 
damages occurred during the 1954, 1973, and 1975 flood). 
66 See PAK. MINISTRY OF CLIMATE CHANGE, NATIONAL DISASTER 
MANAGEMENT PLAN – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, 2 (2012). 
67 See id., at 13 tbls. 12-13. 
68 See Kamal et al., supra note 57, at 18. 
69 Id., at 43. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
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this regard, the construction of embankments is being 
particularly followed, as the embankments along all the 
major rivers have been constructed.72 Thus, the structural 
measures are implemented for flood management in 
Pakistan, while the existing laws do not provide a 
unanimous framework or legal policy for flood 
management.73  
 
D. REDUCTION IN AVERAGE ANNUAL FLOW OF WATER IN 
THE INDUS BASIN 
 
In Pakistan, the average annual flow of river waters is 
approximately 143 MAF.74 More than 80 percent of this 
quantity of water, i.e. 114.4 MAF,75 arrives at the river basins 
due to the melting of glaciers during the summer season.76 
Data on the average flow of river waters indicates that the 
availability of water in the major Indus River tributaries has 
decreased substantially since 1961.77 For instance, the 





74 See Ahmad, supra note 18, at 5. 
75 This quantity can be calculated by multiplying 0.80 with 143 (Hint: 
simple mathematical formula has been used for calculating the 80% of 
143 MAF i.e. percentage multiplied by the total quantity). 
76 See Climate Change Risk Profile – Pakistan, Climate Change 
Adaptation, by Thought Leadership and Assessments (ATLAS) Task 
Order No. AID-OAA-I-14-00013 – USAID, March 2017, at 3, 
https://www.climatelinks.org/sites/default/files/asset/document/201
7_USAID_Climate%20Change%20Risk%20Profile_Pakistan.pdf; see also 
Sh. Mushtaq Ahmed, The water picture of Pakistan, THE NATION, (February 
14, 2017), http://nation.com.pk/14-Feb-2017/the-water-picture-of-
pakistan [hereinafter Sh. Ahmed]. 
77 See IRSHAD AHMAD, ALLAH BAKHSH SUFI, & IMRAN TARIQ, WATER 
RESOURCES OF PAKISTAN 101 (Pakistan Engineering Congress Paper No. 
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average annual flow in the Indus River was 93 MAF in 
1961,78 but this amount has now fallen to approximately 89 
MAF.79  
Similarly, in the Jhelum and Chenab Rivers, the 
average annual flow of water was 23 MAF and 26 MAF in 
1961,80 which has decreased to 22 MAF and 25 MAF, 
respectively.81 Pertinently, the reduction in the average flow 
of water in these rivers could be the result of construction of 
hydropower projects on these rivers by India within its 
territory, which store a substantial amount of water of the 
Indus River tributaries, which reduces the flow of water in 
the Pakistani western rivers.82  
In addition to the Indus River and its tributaries, 
which flow from India to Pakistan, the Kabul River, which 
flows from Afghanistan, has also faced a substantial 
reduction of its average flow of water from 26 MAF in 1961 
to 18.9 MAF in 2000 and 17.4 MAF in 2010.83 The decrease in 
the average annual flow of water in these rivers has also 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
711, 2012), [hereinafter Tariq et. el.]; see also ALLAH BAKHSH SUFI ET. AL., 
INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN PAKISTAN, 37 (Pakistan 
Engineering Congress Paper No. 286, 2009-10) [hereinafter Sufi et. al.]. 
78 See Tariq et. al., supra note 77, at 101; See also Sufi et. al., supra note 77, 
at 37. 
79 See Sh. Ahmed, supra note 76. (Note: The 89 MAF includes the quantity 
of Kabul River 17 MAF. If we subtract this from 89 MAF, then we will 
get 72 MAF, which shows the significant amount of reduction in the 
average annual flow of the Indus River).  
80 See Sufi et al., supra note 77, at 37 tbl. 1. 
81 See Sh. Ahmed, supra note 76. 
82See SHAHEEN AKHTAR, EMERGING CHALLENGES TO INDUS WATERS 
TREATY: ISSUES OF COMPLIANCE & TRANSBOUNDARY IMPACTS OF INDIAN 
HYDROPROJECTS ON THE WESTERN RIVERS, 59 (Institute of Regional 
Studies, 2010) [hereinafter Akhtar]. 
83 See Sufi et al., supra note 77, at 37 tbl. 1. 
80 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 25 
resulted in an overall decrease of the total availability and 
net average flow of river water in Pakistan, from 189 MAF in 
1961 to 138 MAF in 2009-10.84 At present, the total average 
annual flow is 143 MAF,85 which is way lower than the flow 
of 189 MAF in 1961.86 
The per capita availability of water has also decreased 
substantially. In 1960 this was around 4,000 cubic meters.87 
However, this amount fell to 2,100 cubic meters in 1981, 
1,600 cubic meters in 1991, and 1,078 cubic meters in 2001.88 
The amount of water recorded in 2010 was 1,050 cubic 
meters, and this is expected to fall to 877 cubic meters by 
2020.89 Moreover, Pakistan’s population is increasing 
rapidly, which is also putting a strain on per capita water 
usage.90 The population in 1961 was 46 million, and it has 
now passed 180 million.91 In 2020, it is expected to go 
beyond 200 million.92 This has increased per person demand 
for water, but has substantially decreased the per person 
availability of water from 3,950 cubic meters in 1961 to less 
than 1,000 cubic meters93 at present; this has made Pakistan a 
                                                
	
	
84 See id.  
85 See Hassan, supra note 18, at 3. 
86 See Sufi et al., supra note 77, at 37 tbl. 1. 
87 Bashir Ahmad, Water Management: A Solution to Water Scarcity in 
Pakistan, 114, 9 J. Ind. Stud. Res. - Msse, 111, 114 (2011) [hereinafter 
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88 Id. 
89 See Sufi et al., supra note 77, at 41. 
90 See Ahmad, supra note 87, at 114. 
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“water-stressed”94 region. This suggests that immense 
pressure on available water resources is being felt in 
Pakistan. Furthermore, by 2025 it is expected that water 
availability will fall below the 700-cubic meter threshold, 
which will mark Pakistan as a “water-scarce”95 country.96 
The WWF 2012 Report on water management in Pakistan 
suggested that Pakistan would reach water scarcity in 2035,97 
but current data indicates that Pakistan will reach that level 
fifteen years earlier, in 2020.98 This further illustrates the 
swift pace of water shortage that is occurring in Pakistan. 
Unfortunately, the storage capacities of the major 
dams in Pakistan have also fallen significantly in recent 
years. For instance, the Tarbela Dam was completed in 1976 
and had around 9.68 MAF of total water storage capacity at 
that time; this fell to 6.78 MAF in 2009 and 6.5 MAF in 
2012.99 This indicates a total loss of storage capacity of 
around 3.18 MAF in the Tarbela Dam, which is expected to 
reach 4.30 MAF, to a storage capacity of 5.38 MAF, by 
2025.100 The situation is similar for the Mangla Dam, which 
had a total capacity of around 5.34 MAF when it was 
completed in 1967 but over time its storage capacity has 
declined substantially.101 The total storage capacity of 
                                                
	
	
94 Water stress is denoted for a region that has per capita availability of 
water from 1,000 cubic meters to 1,666.7 cubic meters. See Akhtar, supra 
note 82, at 10.  
95 See Akhtar, supra note 82 at 8. Water scarce regions have per capita 
availability of water of less than 1,000 cubic meters.; Id., at 10.  
96 See Id. at 8; See also Sufi et al., supra note 17, at 41. 
97 Kamal et al., supra note 57 at 5.  
98 See Ahmad, supra note 87, at 114; see also Sufi et al., supra note 77, at 41.  
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Mangla, Tarbela, and Chashma has fallen from 16 MAF to 
14.2 MAF.102 Such significant decrease of the storage 
capacities of the major dams points toward the need for the 
government to take measures either to increase the storage 
capacities of these dams by proper maintenance or to 
construct new water storage dams that could store large 
amounts of water resources for the future to minimize the 
substantial annual losses of water. Furthermore, the total 
storage capacities of the major dams, the Tarbela, Mangla, 
and Chashma, are equivalent to 9.8 percent of the total 
average annual flow of river waters in Pakistan.103 This 
further shows that there is a meager availability of stored 
water in the country. 
Owing to the insufficient availability of water in the 
near future, agricultural production is likely to decline.104 
This can create negative effects for the economy and GDP 
because agricultural production constitutes approximately 
25 percent of national GDP.105 Furthermore, the water stored 
in Pakistan’s major dams is primarily used for electricity 
generation.106 A large number of manufacturing firms and 
private businesses rely on this electricity for the functioning 
of their machinery. The absence of water for the Tarbela and 
                                                
	
	
102 See Sh. Ahmed, supra note 76. (Although, the total storage capacity of 
the three dams is 11.2 MAF, but recently the Govt. has upgraded the 
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Mangla Dams can result in shortages of hydropower, which 
will intensify the ongoing load-shedding in the country and 
will threaten the manufacturing sector in Pakistan.107 
Persistent load-shedding for longer hours every day can 
induce foreign investors to withdraw their investment from 
Pakistan in favor of some other country where there is less 
load-shedding, resulting not only in substantial capital flight 
but also the closure of several businesses, eventually raising 
unemployment and discouraging investors from making 
new investment in the country.108 
Furthermore, owing to a significant reduction in 
overall production caused by the shutdown of 
manufacturing firms, GDP will also decline, which is a bad 
sign for the national economy.109 Hence, the shortage of 
water has far-reaching impacts on the economy, making 
Pakistan vulnerable to changes in the flow of water in its 
transboundary rivers. This further indicates an immediate 
need to deal with the factors reducing the availability of 
water in the rivers and negatively affecting current water 
management practices in the country. 
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DEVELOPMENT, 216 (David F. Batten & Charlie Karlsson eds., 1996); see 
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IMPLICATIONS, 10 (World Bank, Discussion Paper No. 213, 1993). 
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https://www.dawn.com/news/1326795. 
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E. FACTORS AFFECTING WATER MANAGEMENT IN 
PAKISTAN 
 
Certain factors affect current water management 
practices in Pakistan and disturb average annual water 
supply in the rivers. The prominent factors are Indian water 
storage projects and adverse, unexpected climate change, 
which cause abnormal increases or decreases in annual 
rainfall. 
 
1. INDIAN WATER STORAGE PROJECTS 
 
India has started constructing mass water storage 
dams over the western rivers, which were allocated to 
Pakistan by the Indus Waters Treaty. For instance, on the 
Chenab River, India has built eleven dams, among which the 
major dams are the Baglihar and Salal Dams.110 In addition, 
India has also completed several hydropower projects on the 
Chenab River, which include the Bichari, Bursar, Karwar, 
Kirthi, Kiru, Gypsa, Naunat, Pakwal Dul, Ratle, Seli, 
Shamnot, and Raoli.111 The Bursar project is the largest 
producer of electricity, 1,020 MW, and Pakwal is producing 
1,000 MW.112 The smallest production is the 104 MW 
produced by the Bichari project.113 On a similar note, on the 
Indus River India has constructed nine hydropower 
projects.114 Similarly, on the Jhelum River there are thirteen 
hydropower generation projects built by India, including the 
                                                
	
	
110 See Akhtar, supra note 82, at 10. 
111 Id., at 28. 
112 Id. 
113 Id., at 28–29. 
114 Id. 
2017 INDUS BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT 85 
notorious Kishanganga Dam, which has a capacity to 
substantially divert the water of the Neelum–Jhelum River 
in Kashmir, leaving the Neelum Valley of Pakistan 
completely deserted.115 
Notably, Pakistan has raised objections to twenty-
seven Indian water projects.116 The most prominent of these 
have been the Baglihar Dam, the Salal project, the Dul Hasti 
power project, the Wullar Barrage, and Kishanganga Dam.117 
We will discuss the issues pertaining to the Kishanganga 
Dam and the Wullar Barrage in this paper. 
According to official statements by Pakistan’s former 
Indus Waters Commissioner, Jamaat Ali Shah, these 
hydropower projects have the capacity to obstruct around 43 
million cubic meters of river water from entering Pakistan.118 
That is why the construction of these dams and hydropower 
projects by India over the western rivers is worrying the 
already water-stressed Pakistan, which is rapidly heading 
toward becoming a water-scarce country.119 
Pertinently, the construction of these Indian water 
projects has already resulted in a substantial decrease in the 
average annual flow of water in the rivers in Pakistan. For 
instance, the water flow in the Chenab River has decreased 
to 6,000 cusecs from its average level of 10,000 cusecs, 
because India has initiated almost a dozen water storage 
projects on the river.120 The construction of the Baglihar Dam 
                                                
	
	
115 Id., at 29. 
116 Id., at 15. 
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by India was the most harmful to Pakistan, resulting in 
blocking a substantial flow of water to the Chenab River. For 
instance, on October 9 and 11, 2009, the Chenab River 
received 19,351 cusecs and 10,700 cusecs per day, 
respectively, despite being expected to receive around 55,000 
cusecs.121 In the event of a complete blockage of water from 
India to the Chenab River contrary to the Indus Waters 
Treaty, more than 400 canals and more than a thousand of its 
tributaries will have no water to irrigate the 7.35 million 
acres of agricultural land in Pakistan.122 
 
a) KISHANGANGA DAM 
 
The Kishanganga Dam constitutes significant harm to 
Pakistan owing to its controversial design.123 The dam is 
being constructed by India on the run of the Neelum and 
Jhelum Rivers in Kashmir.124 The Neelum River meets with 
the Jhelum River in the Muzaffarabad region of Azad 
Kashmir, inside Pakistani territory.125 However, India wants 
the Neelum River to meet the Jhelum River inside territory it 
controls, in Jammu and Kashmir, by diverting the major 
stream of the Neelum River away from Muzaffarabad and 
toward Jammu and Kashmir through its Kishanganga 
project.126 This can literally dry out the naturally beautiful 
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Neelum Valley in Pakistan because the main source of water 
for this valley is the Neelum River, which will not reach 
there adequately if India is successful in diverting it toward 
its Jammu valley.127 Consequently, in the event of low 
rainfall in the Neelum Valley the area can face drought. 
Furthermore, the meeting of the Neelum River with the 
Jhelum River in Jammu can give leverage to India in 
controlling the amount of flow of the Jhelum River toward 
Pakistan.128 It can use this leverage during any conflict or 
war in order to negotiate with Pakistan on its own terms. 
 
b) WULLAR BARRAGE 
 
India aims to construct the Wullar Barrage on the 
Jhelum River. It will have a water storage capacity of 0.30 
MAF, which is several times higher than allowed by the 
Indus Waters Treaty,129 which permits India to store 0.2 
MAF in a barrage over the Jhelum River for non-
consumptive use.130 This indicates a clear violation on the 
part of India in complying with the maximum amount of 
water to be stored for non-consumptive use.131 Moreover, 
India would be able to control the flow of water of the 
Jhelum River to Pakistan through the Wullar Barrage at any 
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time it chooses. The Wullar Barrage will use the water of the 
Wullar Lake, which is a major source of water for the 
Mangla Dam.132 
Hence, according to Pakistan, the Wullar Barrage and 
Kishanganga Dam give considerable leverage to India in 
controlling the water flow of the Jhelum River. Pakistan has 
expressed its fears relating to the Wullar Barrage that India 
can either obstruct or inundate the Jhelum River basin in 
Pakistan through blocking or opening the spillways of these 
projects.133 If the reservations of Pakistan are true, this 
implies that these dams have the potential to cause 
significant harm to Pakistan, which is against the true spirit 
of the Indus Waters Treaty.134 
As the Indian water storage projects have the 
potential to adversely affect water flows in the Pakistani 
rivers, they can also cause adverse effects to agriculture and, 
consequently, an overall reduction in crop production.135 
Any damaging impact on agriculture will also result in 
hostile consequences for the economy.136 Therefore, certain 
Indian water storage projects are a direct threat to the 
agrarian economy of Pakistan. Importantly, they are also 
harming current water management facilities in Pakistan by 





134 See Naz, supra note 123, at 105. 
135 See Han Dorussen et al., Any Ties that Bind? Economic Diplomacy on the 
Sourth Asian Subcontinent, in, ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: ECONOMIC AND 
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 164 (Martinus Nijhoff Pub., 2011); see also Ahmed 
Abukhater, Introduction, in, WATER AS A CATALYST FOR PEACE: 
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 13 
(Routledge, 2013). 
136 See JAVERIA NIAZI, COST OF FLOODS ON PAKISTAN’S ECONOMY 14 
(Anchor Academic Pub., 2013) (discussing the historic adverse effects on 
Pakistan’s agriculture). 
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reducing the availability of water.137 Nonetheless, India has 
never paid attention to Pakistan’s concerns and repeated 
complaints.138 
 
2. CLIMATE CHANGE AND RAINFALL 
 
Climate change affects water management practices 
to a great extent in every region.139 For instance, a substantial 
decrease in rainfall can create a shortage of water in rivers, 
canals, barrages, and other water management facilities. 
Moreover, a complete absence of rainfall for a longer time 
can also create drought.140 Hence, in Pakistan, areas with 
low rainfall are more vulnerable to climate change.141 The 
government’s administrative bodies have made ponds and 
small lakes for storing water in low-rainfall areas. These 
lakes and ponds are, sometimes, the only water management 
facilities available to residents in the event of low rainfall. 
However, with adverse climate change resulting in 
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droughts, these lakes and ponds become dried up. For 
example, during the recent drought in Tharparkar and Dadu 
in Sindh province, the available water resources in these 
regions became dried up, which caused a significant water 
shortage.142 
On the other hand, sometimes climate change also 
results in an abnormal increase in rainfall during the 
monsoon season, which results in amassing the flow of 
water in the river basins in India and in Pakistan.143 
Monsoons occur during the summer season, when the 
melting of Himalayan glaciers takes place, which generates 
large flows of water that run into the Indus river basin. This 
melted water combines with rain water during high 
monsoon rainfalls.144 Consequently, India also discharges a 
large amount of water to Pakistani rivers to protect its own 
land from flooding. This sometimes results in increasing the 
water level in the Indus Basin beyond a sustainable level.145 
Such a situation eventually results in the flooding of the 
basin’s nearby regions in Pakistan.146 The flood level 
becomes more dangerous if the amount of water discharged 
by India into the river basins during these situations is high 
and beyond the storage capacities of the river beds and 
canals in Pakistan. There have been several floods in the 
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country when a high amount of water was drained by India 
into the rivers in Pakistan; this quantity was higher than 
usually discharged by India during other years and 
consequently beyond what could be accommodated by the 
river basins in Pakistan. The floods in the 1970s, 1988, 1992, 
and 2010 were damaging for crops and for the residents of 
the flood-hit areas.147 
Prominently, in a recent example, the flood in July 
2010 caused irreparable damage to the agriculture and 
economy of Pakistan by devastating the crops and houses of 
local people in the flood-affected areas.148 The 2010 flood 
directly affected an estimated twenty million people. More 
than 2,000 people died and the homes of 1.6 million people 
were destroyed by the flood,149 while crops were devastated 
over a large area. The damage to the livestock sector was 
estimated at 48 billion PKR (457 million USD).150 The total 
monetary value of the damage by the flood was estimated to 
be 9.8 billion USD, around six percent of GDP.151 
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Such floods cause damage to the existing water 
management facilities in the country. They sometimes result 
in collapses of barrages and dams. Moreover, the irrigation 
system also suffers considerable damage. This demonstrates 
the adverse effects that abnormal changes in climate can 
cause on water management practices. 
 
3. INCREASE IN COSTS FOR COMPLETION OF WATER 
MANAGEMENT WORKS 
 
Certain Indian projects have resulted in increases of 
the cost of some of the Pakistani water management works. 
This is because India has also started constructing water 
storage works on the same river streams as those on which 
Pakistan had already announced the construction of their 
new dams. For instance, Pakistan announced the Neelum–
Jhelum power project in the last decade.152 Soon after that, 
India announced its plan to build the Kishanganga Dam on 
the Neelum and Jhelum rivers. Both nations have made 
counterclaims of early announcing and starting their 
projects.153 
Pakistan made objections to the Kishanganga Dam as 
it deemed that the dam would have the potential to 
significantly disturb the flow of water in the Jhelum and 
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https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/94668-musharraf-opens-
Neelum–Jhelum-power-project-today. 
153 See Leb et al., supra note 128, at 417. 
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Neelum Rivers,154 which will consequently affect the flow of 
Neelum–Jhelum river water reaching the Neelum–Jhelum 
power project.155 In such a situation, the functionality of the 
project would be questionable. Therefore, it led Pakistan to 
reconsider completing the Neelum–Jhelum project, which 
not only caused a delay in the completion of the first phase 
of the dam but also increased the cost of the dam to at least 
three times the originally perceived cost.156 
India did not address the concerns of Pakistan 
regarding the Kishanganga Dam, which compelled Pakistan 
to file a case against India in the International Court of 
Arbitration.157 The final verdict required India to make 
certain changes in the design of the dam, but it also allowed 
India to continue constructing it.158 The completion of the 
Kishanganga Dam is not favorable to Pakistan,159 so Pakistan 
has decided to not follow the prior-appropriation rule, 
                                                
	
	
154 Id.; see also DHIRENDRA K. VAJPEYI, WATER RESOURCE CONFLICTS AND 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 124 (Lexington Books, 
2012). 
155 See Chaturvedi, supra note 127, at 169.  
156 See generally Neelum–Jhelum Hydropower Project Will be Operational Next 




157 See Wirsing & Adeel, supra note 46, at 40. 
158 Although the court initially ordered India to cease the construction of 
the Kishanganga Dam when Pakistan appealed, it gave its final decision 
in December 2013 when it allowed India to continue constructing the 
Kishanganga Dam. See GUSTAF OLSSON, WATER AND ENERGY: THREATS 
AND OPPORTUNITIES, 19 (IWA Publishing, 2015). 
159 See Bjorn-Oliver Magsig, The Indus Waters Treaty: Modernizing the 
Normative Pillars to Build a More Resilient Future, in, Imagining Industan: 
Overcoming Water Insecurity In The Indus Basin 69, 79 (Zafar Adeel & 
Robert G. Wirsing eds., 2016). 
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which argues the party that first uses a watercourse is 
considered the rightful owner of that water resource.160 
Hence, if Pakistan is able to complete the Neelum–Jhelum 
power project before India’s completion of the Kishanganga 
Dam, Pakistan will be considered the rightful owner of the 
Neelum and Jhelum River streams, on which both of these 
projects are being pursued. Nonetheless, it would induce 
Pakistan to make certain changes to the Neelum–Jhelum 
project to complete it early, having to employ additional 
resources for the earlier completion of the project. This 
would increase the cost of the dam, which is challenging for 
Pakistan because of the financial constraints on the budget of 
its development sector.161 
Without spending additional money, it is impossible 
to complete the dam in time and before India’s completion 
of the Kishanganga Dam.162 It can be said India is disturbing 
Pakistan’s current and future water management plans and 
projects by affecting the water of the western rivers, which 
were originally allocated to Pakistan for its unrestricted use. 
Hence, in a nutshell, we can conclude from the above 
discussion that the overall water-management practices in 
                                                
	
	
160 Pertinently, both India and Pakistan have opted to follow the Prior 
Appropriation Rule related to the Kishanganga project. See Sheila Rai & 
Sanghamitra Patnaik, Water Disputes in South Asia, in, WATER RESOURCE 
CONFLICTS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, 108, 
125 (Dhirendra K. Vajpeyi, ed., 2012). 
161 Mahendra Lal Patel, Global Monitoring of Food Situation of Indian Tribes, 
in, GLOBAL PERCEPTION OF TRIBAL RESEARCH IN INDIA, 28 (Atlantic 
Publishers & Dist., 2002). 
162 This is because the cost of the dam has already increased, and if 
Pakistan employs more resources on the dam then the cost of the new 
resources will add up into the existing high costs.  See WAPDA, supra 
note 156 (offering details about the increase in cost as announced by the 
WAPDA chairman). 
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Pakistan are quite systematic and well structured; however, 
external factors such as obstructions in the flow of water by 
Indian water-storage projects and abnormal climate change, 
which has resulted in substantial increases or decreases in 
rainfall, are negatively affecting the flow of water in the 
rivers and the water-management system in the country. 
 
III. INDUS WATERS TREATY & WATER MANAGEMENT IN THE 
INDUS BASIN 
 
The Indus Waters Treaty provides special 
recommendations for Indus water management to both 
parties to the treaty, India and Pakistan.163 The treaty has 
devised a mechanism to distribute the Indus River and its 
five tributaries by assigning the three eastern river 
tributaries, the Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas Rivers, to India and the 
three western tributaries, the Chenab, Jhelum, and Indus 
Rivers, to Pakistan.164 Articles II, III, IV, and VII relate to the 
management of Indus water by Pakistan and India.165  
 
A. CONSTRUCTION OF DAMS AND BARRAGES—ARTICLE IV 
 
Article IV of the Indus Waters Treaty provides 
guidance on water-management facilities. It recommends 
                                                
	
	
163 Virginia Hooper & Michael McWilliams, Case Studies of Transboundary 
Water Management: Fifteen Initiatives from Various Parts of the World, in, 
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE, 196 
(Anton Earle et al. ed., 2013) [hereinafter: Hopper]. 
164 SIMON MARSDEN, ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES IN ASIAN SUBREGIONS: 
CHINA AND THE THIRD POLE (Edward Elgar Pub., 2017). [hereinafter: 
Marsden]. 
165 See Marsden, supra note 164; see also Indus Waters Treaty, India-Pak., 
arts. II, III, & IV, Sept 19, 1960, 419 U.N.T.S. 6032. 
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water management practices to Pakistan.166 This article 
encourages Pakistan to construct new water-management 
facilities over western rivers to eliminate or reduce its 
dependence on the eastern rivers.167 The eastern rivers are 
allocated to India for unrestricted use.168 Article IV, 
Paragraph 1, states: 
 
Pakistan shall use its best endeavors to construct and 
bring into operation, with due regard to expedition and 
economy, that part of a system of works which will 
accomplish the replacement, from the Western Rivers and 
other sources, of water supplies for irrigation canals in 
Pakistan which, on 15th August 1947, were dependent on 
water supplies from the Eastern Rivers.169 
 
Furthermore, Paragraph 3 of Article IV also 
recommends certain water-management schemes related to 
drainage, sanitation, preservation of soil from erosion, and 
removal of sand from river beds.170 The provision prevents 
India and Pakistan from pursuing such water-management 
schemes that may cause harm to the other or result in 
consumptive use of water in the rivers allotted to the other 
state.171 The first point of Paragraph 3 of Article IV 
states:[E]ach Party will avoid, as far as practicable, any material 
damage to the other Party172 
                                                
	
	
166 Indus Waters Treaty, India-Pak., art. IV, Sept 19, 1960 419 U.N.T.S. 
6032. 
167 See id. 
168 Id. 
169  See id. at art IV, ¶ 1. 
170 See id. at art IV, ¶ 3. 
171 Id.   
172 Id.   
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The treaty also explicitly mentions water-
management endeavors such as barrages, dams, and 
irrigation canals and compels both states to not cause any 
harm to the other in pursuing any of the aforementioned 
water-management works. Paragraph 9 of Article IV states: 
 
Each Party declares its intention to operate its storage 
dams, barrages and irrigation canals in such manner, 
consistent with the normal operations of its hydraulic 
systems, as to avoid, as far as feasible, material damage to 
the other Party.173 
 
However, India’s current use of the western river 
tributaries defies this provision of the treaty because India 
has constructed several water-storage projects on these 
rivers, which have the potential to cause significant harm to 
Pakistan by reducing the annual average flow of water in 
these rivers.174 As set out in the previous section 1.4, the 
average annual flow of these rivers has already fallen in the 
last decade, since the initiation of construction of 
controversial water-storage projects, that is, the Baglihar 
Dam, the Ratle Dam, the Salal and Kishanganga projects, 
etc., by India.175 This reduction in the average annual flow of 
water presents a threat to the current agricultural 
infrastructure in Pakistan, which is heavily reliant on that 
                                                
	
	
173 Id. at art. IV, ¶ 9. 
174 See Magsig, supra note 159, at 79 (discussing the probable harm that 
can be caused to Pakistan by some water management projects of India). 
175 Naz, supra note 123, at 105 (describing the damage that the 
Kishanganga dam can cause to Pakistan); see Dinar et al., supra note 138, 
at 332 (detailing Pakistan’s perceptions related to the likely harm carried 
by the Baglihar dam); see Akhtar, supra note 82, at 31-32 (discussing the 
harm carried by Wullar Barrage). 
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water.176 Thus, water-management facilities in India are 
causing significant harm to Pakistan, which further indicates 
India is failing to follow the true spirit of the Indus Waters 
Treaty. 
 
B. INCREASE IN THE CATCHMENT AREA OF DRAINAGE 
BASINS—ARTICLE IV 
 
The fourth paragraph of Article IV of the treaty 
provides further guidance to Pakistan for the special case 
when Pakistan feels the need to increase the catchment area 
of either its river basins or of any natural or artificial 
drainage basins that receive water drained by India toward 
Pakistan.177 In this regard, Article IV explains that: 
 
[S]hould Pakistan desire to increase the catchment area, 
beyond the area on the Effective Date, of any natural or 
artificial drainage or drain, which receives drainage 
waters from India, or, except in an emergency, to pour 
any waters into it in excess of the quantities received by it 
as on the Effective Date, Pakistan shall, before 
undertaking any work for these purposes, increase the 
capacity of that drainage or drain to the extent necessary 
so as not to impair its efficacy for dealing with drainage 
waters received from India as on the Effective Date.178 
 
                                                
	
	
176 DAVID L. FELDMAN, WATER, 124-155 (2013); see also Daniel Markey, 
Pakistan, in, CLIMATE CHANGE AND NATIONAL SECURITY: A COUNTRY-
LEVEL ANALYSIS, 87 (Daniel Moran ed., 2011). 
177  See Indus Waters Treaty, India-Pak., art. IV ¶ 4, 3, 6. 8, Sept 19, 1960 
419 U.N.T.S. 6032. 
178  Id. 
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The effective date, here, implies the date of the 
signing of the Indus Waters Treaty. Paragraph 4 of Article IV 
also mentions particular drainages—the Kasur Nala, the 
Fazilka Drain, the Hudiara Drain, and the Salimshah 
Drain—and recommends that Pakistan should manage them 
properly in such a manner that no water should reach them 
beyond their capacities.179 That is, Pakistan can make 
adjustments to the capacities of these drains so they capture 
an adequate flow of water India drains.180 This is particularly 
helpful for managing the surplus water India drains during 
emergencies like heavy rainfall and flood threats. The 
purpose of this provision is to protect Pakistani regions near 
these drainage basins from being inundated by surplus 
water. 
Nonetheless, the central issue is India usually does 
not share accurate data related to the surplus water it 
intends to drain toward Pakistan, particularly when there is 
a prevalent sense of hostility and distrust between the 
states.181 Therefore, Pakistan can only make assumptions 
based on previous trends of water drained by India. This 
involves, for Pakistan, inefficacies and problems in 
managing the drainage basins, which, in fact, are caused by 
India’s uncooperative behavior.182 
                                                
	
	
179  See id. 
180 See id.  
181 ALIAR HOSSAIN & MARK T. JONES, DEVELOPING THE MINISTERIAL 
MINDSET: A GLOBAL VIEW 36 (Author House, 2013). [hereinafter: Hossain 
& Jones]. 
182 As elucidated above that India does not share the accurate current 
river data with Pakistan; therefore, we can conclude that Pakistan, at 
most of the times, may lack data for forecasting estimations regarding 
the upcoming flow of water discharged by India in river basins. This 
would create inefficacies in water management, especially in the events 
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C. WATER MANAGEMENT FOR PREVENTING FLOOD 
DAMAGES—ARTICLE IV 
 
The Indus Waters Treaty also includes provisions to 
prevent the adverse effects of flooding on each riparian state. 
In this regard, it allows the construction of new endeavors 
for managing surplus water resources to prevent floods, as 
set out above. However, the treaty also requires each state to 
not cause harm to the other when constructing any scheme 
or project for preventing floods or managing surplus 
water.183 India naturally bears more responsibility because it 
is an upper riparian state and can divert the flow of rivers 
toward Pakistan to protect its own territory from being 
flooded during rainy seasons. Therefore, the Indus Waters 
Treaty specifically instructs India (Paragraph 2 of Article IV) 
to not cause any harm to Pakistan in carrying out its flood-
management endeavors.184 The wording of the article is: 
 
In executing any scheme of flood protection or flood 
control each Party will avoid, as far as practicable, any 
material damage to the other Party, and any such scheme 
carried out by India on the Western Rivers shall not 
involve any use of water or any storage in addition to that 
provided under Article III.185 
 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
of flooding, for Pakistan. Regarding India’s noncooperation in terms of 
not sharing river data, see Id. 
183 See Indus Waters Treaty, India-Pak., art. IV ¶ 2, 3, 6. 8, Sept 19, 1960 
419 U.N.T.S. 6032. 
184 See id. art. IV ¶ 2. 
185 See id. 
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Here, the point of Article III is to prevent India from 
any consumptive diversion of Western Rivers waters, 
whether intended to prevent floods in its own territory or for 
any other reason.186 This is because consumptive use or 
diversion of the Western Rivers by India is regarded as an 
action causing harm to Pakistan,187 for it can result either in a 
shortage of water or flooding during abnormal decreases or 
increases in rainfall, respectively. 
Despite the provision entailing prohibition of the 
consumptive use of Western Rivers, India has continued 
constructing new hydropower and water-storage dams on 
the Western Rivers within its territory, and Pakistan has 
repeatedly complained to India about its consumptive use of 
Western Rivers waters.188 The Wullar Barrage and 
Kishanganga Dam are prominent examples of this, being 
Indian attempts to construct on Jhelum and Neelum Rivers, 
respectively.189 
 
D. UNRESTRICTED USE—ARTICLES II AND III 
 
Article II of the Indus Waters Treaty approves the 
unrestricted use of waters of the Eastern Rivers to India, and 
it allows Pakistan the use of water of these rivers for only 
non-consumptive purposes.190 This means India can 
construct dams or barrages and can use the water of the 
Eastern Rivers for any purpose. However, Pakistan can use 
the water of these rivers for agriculture or domestic 
                                                
	
	
186 SHYAM KISHOR AGARWAL, ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROVERSIES 86 (2002)  
187 Id.  
188 See Magsig, supra note 159, at 79; see also Naz, supra note 123, at 105.  
189 Id. 
190 Indus Waters Treaty, India-Pak., art. IV, Sept. 19, 1960.  
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purposes, and for any purpose that does not result in storage 
or diversion of large flows of water of the Eastern Rivers.191 
On the other hand, Article III provides Pakistan with 
the right to the unrestricted use of the Western Rivers, but it 
also allows India the use of waters of the Western Rivers for 
domestic, agricultural, and hydropower generation, with the 
core restriction of not diverting or affecting their natural 
flow.192 Hence, both states have been restricted from the 
consumptive use of waters of rivers allocated to the other. 
However, India is not fully obeying this provision and has 
initiated dozens of hydropower projects that not only have 
the capacity to store large quantities of Pakistani Western 
River waters but also are intended to divert the streams of 
these river waters and thus have the potential for 
consumptive use of the water of these rivers. For instance, as 
set out above, the Kishanganga Dam, constructed by India 
on the Jhelum and Neelum Rivers, has the potential to affect 
the natural run of this river by either substantially reducing 
or inundating it, as per Indian unilateral will.193 
It is the “unrestricted use”194 of the Western Rivers 
allocated to Pakistan by the Indus Waters Treaty that 
provides legal leverage to Pakistan over the waters of these 
rivers to manage them in any way that serves the agrarian, 
domestic, hydropower, and all other water-related 
requirements of Pakistan.195 That is, Pakistan can manage the 
waters of the Western Rivers through diversion or storage of 
their waters or through any means. Pakistan can construct 




192 See id. at art. III. 
193 See Magsig, supra note 159, at 79.  
194 See generally Indus Waters Treaty, art. III, Sept. 19, 1960.  
195 See id. at art III ¶ 2 & 3.  
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new dams, barrages, or canals for agriculture and electricity 
generation purposes. However, such water-management 
endeavors of Pakistan on these rivers can be affected 
adversely if Indian water-storage projects continue to 
obstruct water flow in the Western Rivers, leading to a 
decline in the amount of water available for dams, canals, 
barrages, and other water-management ventures in Pakistan. 
 
E. CONSTRUCTION OF ENGINEERING WORKS ON THE INDUS 
BASIN—ARTICLE VII 
 
Although both of the two states can initiate 
engineering works on the Indus Basin for any beneficial 
purpose, the water of the Indus Basin is the shared property 
of both states and does not belong solely to either, so Article 
VII of the Indus Waters Treaty compels each state to inform 
the other of plans for constructing any engineering work in 
the Indus Basin that will use the basin’s water.196 This 
provision means one state should not initiate engineering 
work in the Indus Basin without notifying the other, 
particularly when the engineering work could affect water 
availability in the other state’s part of the basin.197 Hence, 
neither India nor Pakistan can accomplish any water-
management engineering project in the Indus Basin without 
sharing relevant information, including detailed plans, 
accurate data relating to the functioning of the project, and 
the size, nature, and effect of the project. Paragraph 2 of 
Article VII states:198 
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198 See id. 
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If either Party plans to construct any engineering work 
which would cause interference with the waters of any of 
the Rivers and which, in its opinion, would affect the 
other Party materially, it shall notify the other Party of its 
plans and shall supply such data relating to the work as 
may be available and as would enable the other Party to 
inform itself of the nature, magnitude and effect of the 
work.199 
 
If India and Pakistan could follow this provision to its 
fullest, then no conflict would arise related to the 
distribution and use of the Indus Basin or to any water-
management engineering project initiated by either state in 
the basin. This is because both states would inform the other 
of its water-management engineering works, which would 
induce both states to discuss the relevant objections by either 
side to engineering works in the Indus Basin. Consequently, 
if discussions remain fruitful and unaffected by past or 
present hostilities, both states can resolve their objections to 
the engineering works together.  
Unfortunately, the reality is contrary to the guidelines 
provided in this provision of the Indus Waters Treaty 
because India never shares with Pakistan the information 
related to its water-management engineering works.200 India 
starts constructing its water-management engineering 
works, whether they are large-storage-capacity dams or 
hydropower projects or barrages, unilaterally and without 
notifying Pakistan.201 This instigates conflict in which 




200 See Hossain & Jones, supra note 181, at 36. 
201 Id. 
2017 INDUS BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT 105 
Pakistan has to express its reservations to the Indian water-
storage project because of the controversial nature of the 
storage facility or functioning of the project. This has been 
the case for several water-management engineering works 
by India, including some of India’s major dams and 
barrages.202 Pakistan has not been provided adequate 
answers and information for twenty-seven controversial 
Indian water-management projects.203 
Overall, these provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty 
indicate its keenness to guide Pakistan and India in their 
water management endeavors.204 Notably, the Indus Waters 
Treaty is the only agreement between the two states that has 
stood for several years and has done so despite ongoing 
hostilities.205 It is the only treaty that has laid out a 
framework and scheme for the equitable distribution of their 
shared transboundary river waters.206  
Therefore, this treaty has foremost importance for 
both states.207 Its endorsement of effective water-
management schemes is a marked example of a treaty 
guiding states to not only distribute and utilize but also 
                                                
	
	
202 See Akhtar, supra note 82. 
203 Id. at 15. 
204 See Marsden, supra note 164. 
205 RAMESH THAKUR, NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE ZONES 163 (Springer, 
2016); See also P.C. BANSIL, WATER MANAGEMENT IN INDIA 37 (2004). 
206 Singh, supra note 48, at 108; see also R.B. MANDAL, WATER RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT 51 (2006). 
207 JASPARRO ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OVER WATER RESOURCES IN 
HIMALAYAN ASIA 46 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). [hereinafter JASPARRO 
ET AL.]. 
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manage their transboundary river waters effectively through 
joint cooperative management of the shared river basin.208 
 
IV. WATER MANAGEMENT IN THE INDUS BASIN IN COMPLIANCE 
WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
International law guides riparian states in managing 
water optimally to benefit both upper and lower riparian 
states.209 These rules are incorporated in certain declarations 
and conventions, which have been endorsed and accepted 
by most states worldwide. The purpose of international law 
in guiding riparian states in managing water is to ensure 
transboundary waters are international water and not the 
private property of a particular country.210  
Therefore, states that share transboundary 
international watercourses have an obligation to follow 
international water laws and relevant principles for 
equitably sharing and using international water resources, 
preferably in a way that doesn’t bring harm or injustice to 
other states. 
 
                                                
	
	
208 See KISHOR UPRETY, CHALLENGES, LESSONS, AND PROSPECTS FOR 
OPERATIONALIZING REGIONAL PROJECTS IN ASIA: LEGAL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS 47 (2014). 
209 VIRPI STUCKI ET AL., WATER AND SECURITY IN CENTRAL ASIA: SOLVING A 
RUBIK'S CUBE (ROUTLEDGE, 2016); see also UNEP/UNDP JOINT PROJECT ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN AFRICA, DEVELOPMENT AND 
HARMONIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS 26 (1999). [Hereinafter: 
UNEP/UNDP]. 
210 Akunga Momanyi, Re-thinking Estuaries Ecosystem Governance in the 
WIO Region, in, ESTUARIES: A LIFELINE OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES IN THE 
WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN 243 (Peter Scheren, Salif Diop, and, John 
Ferdinand Machiwa, eds., 2016). 
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A. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
 
International law stresses maintaining the quality of 
water in river basins.211 It also urges states to make 
environment assessments related to their water resources.212 
 
1. THE BERLIN RULES 
 
In this regard, Articles 27 to 33 of the Berlin Rules 
strictly instruct states to take adequate measures to not only 
prevent pollution but also remove hazardous substances that 
have already been discharged into watercourses by factories 
and other entities.213 Furthermore, Article 28 explains the 
purpose of maintaining water quality: “States shall establish 
water quality standards sufficient to protect public health.”214 
Maintaining quality freshwater resources results in 
preserving health for the people who use that water resource 
for drinking and domestic purposes.215 Furthermore, 
improved quality of irrigation water is also essential for 
crops; that is, irrigating water should not contain nutrients 
                                                
	
	
211 LAURENCE BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, FRESH WATER IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 160 (OUP Oxford, ed. 2013). [hereinafter Boisson]; see also Laurence 
Boisson de Chazournes, The Role of Diplomatic Means of Solving Water 
Disputes: A Special Emphasis on Institutional Mechanisms, in, RESOLUTION 
OF INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES, 101-104, (Int’l Bureau of the 
Permanent Ct. of Arb., ed., 2002). 
2013). 
212 See also UNEP/UNDP, supra note 209 at 26.  
213 See INT’L LAW ASS’N, BERLIN CONFERENCE (2004), WATER RES. LAW, 
FOURTH REP., ARTICLES 27 TO 33. [Berlin Conference]. 
214 Id. at art. 28. 
215 See Boisson, supra note 211, at 160; see also UNESCO, THE U.N. WORLD 
WATER DEV. REP. 4: MANAGING WATER UNDER UNCERTAINTY AND RISK 24 
(2012). 
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that are harmful to crops.216 This is applicable to both India 
and Pakistan. Both states are dependent on agriculture for 
fulfilling their demands for food and adding production 
value to their GDP.217 Because the preservation of the natural 
aquatic environment is the main intention of these laws, 
both countries must take adequate measures to prevent 
pollution in their shared river courses, as well as in their 
other freshwater resources. For this purpose, states must 
also review their water-management projects so as to assess 
their effect on the environment. This is also recommended in 
Article 31 of the Berlin Rules, which stresses assessment of 
watercourses, environments, ecosystems, human health, 
ecology, and other activities that may be directly affected by 
a water-management project.218 Article 29 further requires 
that states make assessments of their watercourses.219 The 
language of the article is as follows: 
 
1. States shall undertake prior and continuing assessment 
of the impact of programs, projects, or activities that may 
have a significant effect on the aquatic environment or the 
sustainable development of waters.220 
2. Impacts to be assessed include, among others: 
a. Effects on human health and safety; 
b. Effects on the environment; 
                                                
	
	
216 See generally AMOS FEIGIN ET AL., IRRICATION WITH TREATED SEWAGE 
EFFLUENT 25-26, (E. Bresler et al. eds., 1991) (discussing the beneficial and 
harmful nutrients in the irrigation water for crops). 
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c. Effects on existing or prospective economic activity; 
d. Effects on cultural or socio-economic conditions; and 
e. Effects on the sustainability of the use of waters.221 
 
Moreover, Article 8 of the Berlin Rules, which is titled 
“Minimization of Environmental Harm,” prohibits states 
from causing any harm or damage to the environment in 
their water-management endeavors.222 It reads “States shall 
take all appropriate measures to prevent or minimize 
environmental harm.”223This means India must make certain 
arrangements to prevent or mitigate the chances of causing 
environmental harm to the Indus River Basin. Pertinently, 
India’s Kishanganga Dam is a threat to the natural aquatic 
environment and agrarian lands of the Neelum Valley in 
Pakistan’s Azad Kashmir because the dam includes a plan to 
divert the Neelum River water away from the Neelum 
Valley.224  
Owing to the significant environmental harm 
associated with the Kishanganga Dam and in accordance 
with the international legal obligation to not cause harm to 
the environment, India must either halt the controversial 
Kishanganga project or make substantial adjustments to its 
implementation plan to make it favorable enough for the 
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2. THE UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION 
 
The preservation of the ecosystem is paramount and 
obligatory on all riparian states.225 In addition to the Berlin 
Rules, the UN Watercourses Convention also endorses the 
protection of ecosystems and related environmental life. 
Article 20 of the UNWC reads: “Watercourse States shall, 
individually and, where appropriate, jointly, protect and preserve 
the ecosystems of international watercourses.”226 
This further implies an obligation on all states to 
preserve and protect the natural ecosystem linked with 
international watercourses.227 However, for the natural 
Indus Basin, Indian endeavors to complete the controversial 
Kishanganga Dam that appears to be contrary to this 
principle.228 As, the construction of Kishanganda dam 
carried harm to the natural environment of the Neelum 
Valley;229 therefore, the construction of this dam can be 
regarded as a violation to the UN Watercourses Convention, 
which endorses protection of the natural environment of 
international watercourses.230 Hence, in accordance with 
Article 20 of the UN Watercourses Convention, India should 
assess the environmental harm of the Kishanganga Dam on 
                                                
	
	
225 ALISTAIR RIEU-CLARKE, INT’L LAW & SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: 
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Sergei Vinogradov eds., 2005) [Hereinafter: RIEU-CLARKE]. 
226 G.A. Res. 51/229, art. 20 U.N. Doc A/RES/51/229 (May 21, 1997). 
227 See id.  
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the Neelum Valley. For the purposes of such an assessment, 
India can make joint arrangements with Pakistan. It can take 
suggestions from Pakistan to ensure minimum harm is 
caused to the Neelum Valley region from its Kishanganga 
Dam. 
 
3. SUPPLEMENTAL RULES ON POLLUTION 
 
Article 3 of the Supplemental Rules on Pollution is 
relevant to the discourse of assessing the effects of the 
Kishanganga Dam on the Neelum Valley. Article 3 
recommends that: 
 
in using the waters of an international drainage basin, 
States individually or jointly as appropriate shall ensure 
prior assessment of the impact of programs or projects 
that may have significant transboundary effect on the 
environment or on the sustainable use of the waters.231 
 
Nonetheless, India has not taken any measures before 
initiating the Kishanganga Dam to assess its environmental 
impacts, and Pakistan has already expressed its concerns 
related to its damaging environmental consequences for the 




                                                
	
	
231 See The Int’l Law Ass’n, Rep. of the Sixty-Seventh Conf. Held at 
Helinski 414, 1996; see also Rieu-Clarke, supra note 225, at 141. 
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B. NO-HARM PRINCIPLE 
 
According to the no-harm principle, one riparian state 
must minimize the harm to the other, and it must not cause 
any additional significant harm to another state through any 
of its water management-endeavors.233 This principle has 
been endorsed by the International Law Association (ILA), 
the United Nations, World Commission on Dams (WCD), 
World Commission on Water for 21st Century (WCW), and 
the World Water Council (WWC).234 
 
1. THE UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION, ARTICLE 7: 
OBLIGATION NOT TO CAUSE HARM   
 
Article 7 of the UN Watercourses Convention 
(UNWC) has included an application of this principle, titled 
“obligation not to cause significant harm,” in defining a 
relationship between the riparian states for sharing a 
transboundary watercourse.235 Article 7 of the UNWC 
explicitly prevents riparian states from causing any 
significant harm to the other state in any manner.236 It reads: 
 
Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an international 
watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate 
                                                
	
	
233 PHILIP ALSTON & SARAH KNUCKEY, THE TRANSFORMATION OF HUMAN 
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234 See SALMAN M.A. SALMAN, THE WORLD BANK POLICY FOR PROJECTS ON 
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57 (World Bank Publications, 2009). 
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measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to 
other watercourse States.237 
 
Hence, in accordance with the UN Watercourses 
Convention, in accomplishing its own water management 
endeavors India must not cause harm to other riparian 
states, i.e., Pakistan. This principle is similar to an article of 
the Belgrade Rules, as set out below. 
 
2. THE BELGRADE RULES 
 
Article 1 of the Belgrade Rules on the Relationship of 
International Water Resources with other Natural Resources 
and Environmental Elements requires that: 
 
States shall ensure that [t]he development and use of 
water resources within their jurisdiction do not cause 
substantial injury to the environment of other States.238 
 
This rule is by Article IV of the Helsinki Rules, which 
has a similar provision preventing states from causing any 
significant harm or damage to other states or to their 
environments.239 
Nonetheless, India has not followed these principles, 
and its newly planned and initiated water storage projects 
on the western rivers are causing significant harm to 
Pakistan in terms of depriving it of its due share of the 
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western river waters.240 The average annual flows in the 
Chenab, Jhelum, and Indus Rivers have already fallen to a 
great extent, as set out in the introduction to this paper.241 If 
the contentious Indian projects under construction are 
completed, there would be a further reduction of the average 
annual flow of water in the western rivers, which will 
threaten the agricultural infrastructure in Pakistan.242 Such 
harm would be significant enough to cause a decline in 
agricultural production and, consequently, to the GDP and 
growth rate of Pakistan, because the agriculture contributes 
to the GDP to a great extent in Pakistan.243 
 
C. JOINT WATER MANAGEMENT OR BASIN-WIDE JOINT 
MANAGEMENT 
 
Joint water management is becoming popular in the 
international discourse of water management244 because it is 
considered the most effective way of managing 
                                                
	
	
240 For details about Pakistan’s perceptions related to the likely harm 
carried by the Baglihar dam see Dinar et al., supra note 138, at 332; see also 
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transboundary watercourses245 It endorses equitable 
utilization, sustainable development, and integrated 
management of water resources.246 Moreover, it also ensures 
the mutual benefit of all parties that take part in the joint 
management of common water resources.247  
This technique can be adopted by India and Pakistan 
for collaboratively managing and developing the Indus 
Basin and incurring mutual benefits from it.248 The 
possibility of implementing the joint water-management 
schemes for the Indus Basin can prevent disputes relating to 
water resources between the two countries,249 because every 
water-management project on the Indus Basin will be 
                                                
	
	
245 DINARA ZIGANSHINA, PROMOTING TRANSBOUNDARY WATER SECURITY 
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implemented with mutual consultation, consent, and 
cooperation through joint-management mechanisms.250 
Provisions in international law govern certain aspects 
of basin-wide joint management.251 Here we will explore the 
Berlin Rules, the UN Watercourses Convention, and the 
Rules on the Regulation of the Flow of International 
Watercourses, specifically focusing on their provisions on 
basin-wide joint management at the international level. 
 
1. BERLIN RULES, ARTICLES 64, 65, AND 67 
 
Article 64 of the Berlin Rules endorses the joint 
management of a transboundary river basin in the following 
words: “[w]hen appropriate, basin States shall establish other 
joint mechanisms for the management of waters.”252 
Article 65 of the Berlin Rules also details aspects that 
can be covered by joint management mechanisms:253 it 
recommends collaboration from both sides on technical and 
scientific expertise and research programs related to the 
development, upgrade, and optimal utilization of the shared 
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basin from both sides.254 Article 65 further recommends 
signing a formal agreement between the parties to finalize 
arrangements related to joint expense management, the legal 
sphere of the joint collaboration, the functioning of the joint 
mechanisms, the duration of the joint endeavors, the roles 
and authorities of joint bodies, and the key objectives of joint 
management of the shared river basin.255 
Pertinently, these things being finalized before the 
establishment of a joint-management system for the Indus 
Basin would help India and Pakistan collaborate without 
raising conflicts in the management, utilization, and 
development of the Indus Basin. Both will be able to resolve 
their differences and put their joint efforts for upgrading of 
the Indus Basin to reap mutual benefits. 
 
2. THE UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION 
 
The UN Watercourses Convention has endorsements 
for the establishment of joint mechanisms for developing 
and using international watercourses.256 Article 24 of the 
Convention sets out its support for the joint management of 
transboundary watercourses: 
 
Watercourse States shall, at the request of any of them, 
enter into consultations concerning the management of 
an international watercourse, which may include the 
establishment of a joint management mechanism.257 





256 See Kibaroğlu, supra note 251, at 157. 
257 G.A. Res. 51/229 art. 24, Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (May 21, 1997). 
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The management of international watercourses is also 
defined in the text of this article:258 
 
Management refers, in particular, to: 
a) Planning the sustainable development of an 
international watercourse and providing for the 
implementation of any plans adopted; and 
b) Otherwise promoting the rational and optimal 
utilization, protection and control of the watercourse.259 
 
Thus, the management of an international watercourse is 
related to the planning, sustainable development, protection, 
and optimal utilization of water resources. 
This implies if either of the two rival states, India and 
Pakistan, wants to initiate a joint mechanism for Indus water 
management through mutual bilateral support and 
collaboration and also sends a formal request to the other 
state, the state receiving the request would be required to 
facilitate collaboration and consultation with the other to 
establish the joint water-management mechanism. This can 
ensure a purposeful orientation of consultation between the 
states and, if such consultations are successful, would build 
a new wave of coordination and mutual trust between the 
states. Furthermore, such joint management of the basin 
would contribute to the development, upgrading, and 
optimal use of the basin. The joint management would also 
not result in harm to either state from any water 
management endeavor in the Indus Basin. 
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D. SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT 
 
Sustainable management of water resources is the 
most popular idea in the international legal arena, but 
achieving it is also one of the greatest current challenges 
related to water management.260 Sustainable management of 
a water resource is beneficial for its upgrading as well as 
preservation.261 Moreover, it results in an environmentally 
friendly use of the water resource.262 International law has 
offered tremendous support for the sustainable management 
of international water resources.263 
 
1. BERLIN RULES 
 
Article 7 of the Berlin Rules explicitly instructs states 
to take substantial steps to sustainably manage water 
resources.264 It reads: [s]tates shall take all appropriate measures 
to manage waters sustainably.265 Article 40 repeats the goal:266 
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States shall give effect to the principle of sustainability in 
managing aquifers, taking into account natural and artificial 
recharge.267 
In addition to the surface water resources, the Berlin 
Rules also recommend states pay attention to sustainably 
managing groundwater resources. Article 38 of the Rules 
recommends states take adequate action to sustainably 
manage groundwater resources and aquifers.268 This 
principle is fully applicable to India and Pakistan, which rely 
heavily on the use of groundwater for irrigating crops in 
regions river water does not reach.269 Because of the 
excessive use of groundwater resources in these regions, 
groundwater levels are depleting and possibly harming the 
future availability of groundwater in these regions.270 
Therefore, both states need to take adequate measures to 
sustainably develop and manage the river basin water to 
reduce their dependence on groundwater use. 
 
2. THE JOHANNESBURG DECLARATION ON SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
The Johannesburg Declaration supports the 
sustainable development of the natural ecosystem and 





269 K.G. Villholth et al., The Role of Groundwater in Agriculture, Livelihoods, 
and Rural poverty Alleviation in the Indo-Gangetic and Yellow River Basins: A 
Review, in, GROUNDWATER GOVERNANCE IN THE INDO-GANGETIC AND 
YELLOW RIVER BASINS 3 (Aditi Mukherji et al., 2009). 
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resources.271 It elucidates the benefits of achieving 
sustainable development in all fields.272 According to the 
declaration, sustainable development leads to improved 
quality of life.273 Furthermore, for achieving sustainable 
development, it is also essential that resources are upgraded 
for their long-term sustenance and protection; for instance, 
the water resources should be protected from pollution and 
degradation.274 Special measures taken for the upgrading of 
a water resource can lead to its sustainable development.275 
India and Pakistan both need to take such measures 
for the well-being, upgrading, and development of the Indus 
Basin to achieve sustainable development in the basin. This 
is required because sustainable development prevents the 
depletion of natural resources,276 and the Indus Basin is 
important enough to both states that it will be protected 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
Water management is one of the most important 
requirements of the agricultural economy of Pakistan.277 
However, the adverse changes in climate and the obstruction 
of flow of water by the Indian water-storage works are 
causing issues for water management in Pakistan.278 The 
government of Pakistan has plans to construct new water-
storage facilities in the country;279 however, certain new 
Indian water-storage projects are causing an increase in cost 
for the projects under construction in Pakistan.280 For 
instance, India’s Kishanganga Dam’s construction has 
induced Pakistan to complete its Neelum–Jhelum power 
project so as to acquire adequate water for the project from 
the Neelum River before India uses it for its Kishanganga 
Dam. This is in accordance with the prior-appropriation 
rule, which states the country that uses a particular water 
resource first is the legitimate owner of that resource.281 The 
Kishanganga Dam poses a direct threat to water availability 
in the Neelum Valley and for the Neelum–Jhelum project.282 
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In addition to the Kishanganga Dam, there are several 
Indian water-storage projects that are threatening irrigation 
and water-management practices in Pakistan by reducing 
the flow of river waters to Pakistan.283 The average annual 
flow of waters in the Pakistani rivers has already declined 
significantly.284 Furthermore, the storage capacities of the 
largest water-storage facilities in Pakistan, the Tarbela, the 
Mangla, Chashma, and other smaller dams, have decreased 
to a great extent.285 This is creating a challenging situation 
for the existing water-management endeavors of Pakistan. 
Pakistan has repeatedly requested India reconsider its new 
water-storage projects because these projects have the 
potential to cause significant harm to the natural water 
flows, agriculture, and ecosystem in Pakistan; however, 
India has mostly neglected Pakistan’s concerns.286  
Negative effects on agriculture mean an adverse 
impact on the economy in Pakistan. This is because 
agriculture is an important pillar of Pakistan’s economy 
because it is the largest sector in terms of national GDP.287 
International law prevents such measures by India, 
for principles and rules of international law prohibit 
inflicting any significant harm to the natural environment of 
one state by another in fulfilling its water-management 
endeavors. Article 7 of the UN Watercourses Convention 
and Article 1 of the Belgrade Rules are focused on the 
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obligation on states to not cause any significant harm to 
others.288  
Furthermore, the Berlin Rules, the UN Watercourses 
Convention, and the Supplemental Rules on Pollution also 
make it obligatory for a state to make an appropriate 
assessment of the environmental impacts of its water 
management practices within its territory as well as on 
neighboring states. However, India appears to be 
noncompliant with these conventions and rules of 
international law because it has not made appropriate 
assessments of the adverse effects on the natural 
environment and water habitat that its water storage works 
carry with them. 
In addition to the international conventions and 
principles, the Indus Waters Treaty, which is a bilateral legal 
agreement between India and Pakistan, prohibits India from 
causing any harm in pursuing its water-management 
endeavors to Pakistan.289 It prevents India from taking 
consumptive use of water in the western rivers.290 However, 
according to Pakistan, certain Indian water-management 
projects on the western rivers have caused violations of the 
Indus Waters Treaty because of their consumptive 
utilization of the waters of western rivers.291 For instance, the 
Kishanganga Dam is being constructed on the Jhelum River 
and has the potential to divert or substantially affect the 
natural flow of the Jhelum River,292 which constitutes 
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consumptive use of the Jhelum River water not allowed by 
the Indus Waters Treaty.293 
On the other hand, the Indus Waters Treaty also 
includes policies and mechanisms for water management for 
the mutual benefit of both states.294 After equitably 
apportioning the Indus water between India and Pakistan, it 
provides recommendations to Pakistan and India for 
constructing their water management engineering works for 
efficiently utilizing and benefitting from the Indus Basin.295  
It also recommends that both states exchange data 
with each other on a regular basis related to the flow of 
water in their rivers and to their planned, under-
construction, and existing water-storage works.296 This has 
been made obligatory by the Indus Waters Treaty so each 
state may know about the water-management works of the 
other state that are being constructed on the shared Indus 
Basin.297 
If India starts following the principles of the Indus 
Waters Treaty, international conventions, and international 
water laws, a great sense of cooperation for the sustainable 
and basin-wide joint water management between India and 
Pakistan can arise, which will produce mutual benefits for 
both states. This is because both states require the water of 
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the shared river basin for agriculture, hydropower 
generation, drinking, and domestic purposes.298 However, 
the current situation goes against this, because India has 
reportedly threatened to revoke or modify the Indus Waters 
Treaty to gain a greater share of water in the Indus Basin for 
its water-management endeavors,299 which can lead to the 
additional deprivation of Pakistan of its due share of water 
in the Indus Basin and consequently threaten its existing and 
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